Read this article about the precipitating factors of European imperialism toward the rest of the world, including Africa. The export of violence would "come home to roost in 1914".
The Decline of the Ottoman Empire
While it is not always
considered as part of the history of European imperialism, not least
because the core of its empire was never conquered by European powers,
it is still appropriate to examine the decline of the Ottoman Empire
alongside more conventional expressions of European empire-building.
Simply put, while the Ottoman Empire suffered from its fair share of
internal problems, European imperialism played the single most
significant role in undermining its sovereignty and coherence until it
finally collapsed in World War I.
By the late nineteenth
century Europeans casually referred to the Ottoman Empire as the "sick
man of Europe" and debated "the eastern question," namely how Ottoman
territory should be divided between the great powers of Europe. That
attitude was a microcosm of the attitude of Europeans toward most of the
world at the time: foreign territories were prizes for the taking, the
identities of the people who lived there and the states that ruled them
of little consequence thanks to the (short-lived, as it turned out)
superiority of European arms and technology. The great irony in the
case of the Ottomans, however, was that the empire had been both a
European great power in its own right and had once dominated its
European rivals in war. How did it become so "sick" over time?
Some
of the reasons for Ottoman decline were external, most obviously the
growth in European power. The Ottomans were never able to make headway
against European powers in the Indian Ocean, and as European states
build their global trade empires the Ottoman economy remained largely
landlocked. Likewise, the European Scientific Revolution of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had no analog in Ottoman lands; it
took until 1727 for a state-approved printing house printing secular
works and there were no significant technological breakthroughs
originating in the later Ottoman Empire.
The state that proved
the greatest threat to Ottoman power was Russia. Russia went from a
backwards, politically fractured region to a powerful and increasingly
centralized state under its Tsar Peter the Great (whose reign is
described in the previous volume of this textbook). Peter launched the
first major Russo-Ottoman war and, while he did not achieve all of his
military objectives, he did demonstrate the growing strength of the
Russian military by seizing Ottoman territory. In 1744 the empress
Catherine the Great's army crushed Ottoman forces and captured the
Crimean Peninsula, securing the Russian dream of warm water (i.e. it did
not freeze during the winter) ports for its navy. Catherine also
forced the Ottomans to agree to the building of an Orthodox cathedral in
Constantinople and the "protection" of Orthodox Christians in Ottoman
lands – this was a massive intrusion into Ottoman sovereignty over its
own subjects.
Other issues that undermined Ottoman strength were
internal. Notably, the Janissaries (who had once been elite
slave-soldiers who had bested European forces during the height of
Ottoman power) that had played such a key role in Ottoman victories
under sultans like Selim I and Suleiman the Magnificent were nothing
more than parasites living off the largess of the state by the
mid-eighteenth century, concentrating their time on enrichment through
commerce rather than military training. In 1793 a reforming sultan,
Selim III, created a "New Force" of soldiers trained in European tactics
and using up-to-date firearms, but it took until 1826 for the
Janissaries to be eliminated completely (they were slaughtered by
members of the New Force under the next sultan, Mahmud II).
Meanwhile,
the Ottoman economy was largely in the hands of Europeans by the turn
of the nineteenth century. "Capitulation Agreements" that had begun as
concessions to religious minorities had been extended to European
merchants over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the late
eighteenth century, both Europeans and their local (i.e. Ottoman) agents
were basically above the law in Ottoman territories and they also
enjoyed freedom from most forms of taxation. The state was helpless to
reimpose control over its own economy or to restrain European greed
because of the superiority of European military power, and European
trading companies reaped huge profits in the process.
The
nineteenth century was thus an era of crisis for the empire. In 1805
the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, seized power and governed
Egypt as an indepedent state despite being (on paper) an official
working for the Ottoman government. In 1839 Resid Pasha, a high-ranking
official serving the sultan Abd al-Macid, instituted a broad reform
movement, the Tanzimat, that introduced sweeping changes to Ottoman
governance and law, culminating in a liberal constitution and the first
meeting of an Ottoman parliament in 1876. The same year, however, the
reactionary Sultan Abdulhamit II (r. 1876 – 1909) came to power and soon
did everything he could to roll back the reforms. Abdulhamit heavily
emphasized the empire's Muslim identity, inviting conservative Sunni
clerics from across the Islamic world to settle in the empire and
playing up the Christian vs. Muslim aspect of European aggression. In
the process, he moved the empire away from its traditional identity as
religiously diverse and tolerant.
Part of Abdulhamit's emphasis
on Muslim identity was due to a simple demographic fact, however: much
of the non-Muslim territories of the empire seized their independence
either before or during his reign. The Greek Revolution that began in
1821 garnered the support of European powers and ultimately succeeded in
seizing Greek independence. Serbia became completely independent in
1867, Bulgaria in 1878, and Bosnia passed into Austrian hands in 1908.
Simply put, the Christian-dominated Balkans that had been part of the
Ottoman Empire for centuries slipped away thanks to the strength of
modern nationalism and the military support they received from
sympathetic European powers.
Meanwhile, while Abdulhamit hoped in
vain that doubling down on his own role as sultan and caliph would
somehow see the empire through its period of weakness, other Ottoman
elites reached very different conclusions. High-ranking officers in the
Ottoman military educated in the (European-style) War College
established during the Tanzimat formed a conspiratorial society known as
the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889. Disgusted by what
they regarded as the hopelessly archaic approach of Abdulhamit, they
launched a successful coup d'etat in 1909 and set out to remake the
empire as a modern, secular, and distinctly Turkish (rather than
diverse) state. World War I, however, began in 1914 and ultimately
dealt the empire its death blow as European powers both attacked the
empire directly and encouraged uprisings among its ethnic and religious
minorities.
When the dust settled, one of the leaders of the CUP,
Mustafa Kemal, led a Turkish army to expel European forces from the
geographic core of the former empire, namely Anatolia, and form a new
nation in its place. Soon known as Atatürk ("Father of the Turks"),
Kemal pushed through a constitution that explicitly rejected the state's
Muslim identity, adhering instead to the secularism of European and
American countries. It also, however, represented a nation of ethnic
Turks, with minority groups either expelled or slaughtered outright.
The most horrific violence of the Turkish revolution was directed at the
Armenian minority, with over a million Armenians forced on death
marches into deserts or murdered outright. While the state of Turkey
refuses to acknowledge it to this day, historians have long recognized
that the Armenian massacres amounted to a full-scale genocide.
To
sum up, the Ottoman Empire was beset by external pressures in the form
of growing European military might and European intrusion into its
economy. It also suffered from internal issues, most notably the
corruption of the Janissaries and the intransigence of reactionaries
like Abdulhamit. Its reform movements culminated in the CUP revolution
of 1909, but world war tore the empire apart before those reforms had
time to take effect. And, while Turkey entered the world stage as a
modern nation, it was a modern nation with the blood of over a million
people on the hands of its leaders. In that sense, Turkey was like
European imperialism in reverse: Western European states left a trail of
bodies as they built empires around the globe while Turkey's genocidal
crime came about during imperial collapse.